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Abstract. In this paper we address the question of what determines the content of 
our conscious episodes of thinking, considering recent claims that phenomenal 
character individuates thought contents. We present one prominent way for 
defenders of phenomenal intentionality to develop that view and then examine 
‘sensory inner speech views’, which provide an alternative way of accounting for 
thought-content determinacy. We argue that such views fare well with inner 
speech thinking but have problems accounting for unsymbolized thinking. Within 
this dialectic, we present an account of the nature of unsymbolized thinking that 
accords with and can be seen as a continuation of the activity of inner speech, 
while offering a way of explaining thought-content determinacy in terms of 
linguistic structures and representations.  
 
1. The indeterminacy problem: phenomenal intentionality vs. naturalistic 
programs 
 In recent years, the phenomenal intentionality program has garnered interest 
within the philosophical debate surrounding intentionality. Phenomenal intentionality is 
intentionality that can be attributed to a mental state, purely in virtue of its phenomenal 
character (Kriegel, 2014: 2). Different views of how to describe and explain such 
intentionality stress, in one way or another, a close connection to (phenomenal) 
consciousness: the so-called ‘inseparatism’ claim (Horgan and Tienson, 2002). Such 
views offer a new perspective on the question of content determinacy, that is, on what it 
is that warrants a certain content of a mental state and not some other: phenomenal 
character plays this role in explaining intentionality. These views are typically 
contrasted with naturalistic approaches to intentionality which attempt to explain 
intentionality reductively through a relation that holds between the organism and the 
environment, by way of some kind of representational device. One major problem that 
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naturalistic theories of content encounter is the so-called indeterminacy of content (see 
Neander, 2012 for an overview). This problem concerns the alleged result that 
naturalistic theories warrant more than one content attribution in cases where just one is 
correct1.  
In this paper we will be concerned with the determinacy of contents of occurrent 
episodes of thinking (e.g., judging that p, or entertaining that q), which are also the 
focus of much of the cognitive phenomenology debate. The problem that naturalistic 
theories allegedly face in this case is that they do not have the necessary tools to specify 
which content an individual’s occurrent thought has: it seems that we cannot 
distinguish, on the basis of such theories, between thinking ‘there is a red apple here’, 
‘there is a red apple-shaped patch here’, ‘a red apple or a round red pear is in front of 
me’, or ‘there is something edible over there’. There are several issues involved here 
that we do not need to address in detail; the literature on how to address the obstinate 
problem of indeterminacy from a naturalistic viewpoint is huge and the approaches are 
varied. Here, we only wish to note a contrast between naturalist and phenomenalist 
approaches to intentionality: whereas most kinds of reductive naturalistic theories of 
intentionality have tended to set aside conscious intentionality as a derivative form of 
intentionality, the phenomenal intentionality program precisely gives phenomenal 
consciousness a preeminent role in explaining intentionality and thus content 
determinacy. In this way, we delineate our own proposal for a third, alternative way of 
accounting for thought—content determination.  
This paper is thus devoted to the issue of what determines or individuates the 
																																																						
1 A locus classicus of this debate concerning the contents of perception is the determination of a frog’s 
visual contents (see, e.g., Loewer and Rey, 1991). Note that, although most of the examples discussed 
concern the contents of basic-level representations, naturalistic approaches also try to account for the 
contents of conceptual and propositional representations, usually by providing an account of Mentalese 
semantics (see again Loewer and Rey, 1991). 
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contents of occurrent conscious episodes of thinking2. We start by presenting the 
motivations for the thesis that phenomenal character can provide the required thought-
content determinacy. Then we examine an alternative way of accounting for the 
determination of thought contents, the ‘sensory inner speech view’, which emerges from 
a certain way of thinking about self-knowledge. We argue that such a view fares well 
with linguistic thinking, but has problems accounting for ‘unsymbolized thinking’ (UT) 
(Hurlburt and Akhter, 2008), characterized as conscious thinking that involves no 
sensory or perceptual vehicle. Against this dialectic background, we present a view of 
the nature of UT that accords with and can be seen as a continuation of the activity of 
inner speech, and also offers a new way of explaining thought-content determinacy. 
Interestingly, the view we propose does not endorse the individuative claim, but is in 
harmony with one aspect of phenomenal intentionality views: the idea that determinacy 
is in some way connected to consciousness. This connection, in our account, is via 
linguistic capacity.  
As we say, we will not dwell on the details of naturalistic approaches and 
throughout the paper we mention them only occasionally, always conditionally: what 
would happen if they worked, and what would happen if they did not. If the general 
problems naturalistic views encounter are not as acute as we assume, our account will 
be limited to explaining the determination of the contents of conscious episodes of 
thinking. However, if naturalistic views are as beleaguered as we believe them to be, 
what follows from the picture we present is that only conscious episodes of thinking 
have determinate contents. Moreover, even if naturalistic views could account in some 
way for a determinate content of unconscious episodes of thinking, we claim that such a 
																																																						
2 We understand conscious episodes of thinking that p as occurrent mental episodes having both a 
propositional content and an attitude component (judging, entertaining, doubting, assuming, etc.), and 
they should be distinguished from thoughts as standing states (beliefs, etc.) and as mere propositional 
contents.  
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content is not identical to the content that related conscious episodes of thinking have 
(i.e., the truth conditions of the content of the unconscious episode differ from those of 
the conscious episode). If naturalistic views fail, our perspective entails that determinate 
truth-conditional contents are only to be found in episodes of conscious thinking.  
In the discussion, however, it will emerge that the position that our account 
occupies is not defined by the contrast between naturalism and phenomenalism, but 
between the latter and sensory inner speech views, in that it has interesting 
commonalities and differences with each of them.  
 
2. Cognitive Phenomenology and Content Individuation  
  The phenomenal intentionality framework has allowed some authors to present a 
new perspective on the problem of thought—content indeterminacy. A seemingly 
natural suggestion within this family of views is the idea that phenomenal 
consciousness gives rise to determinate content. The version of this general claim that 
interests us here is the view that cognitive phenomenology3 grounds thought contents, 
or gives determinacy to thought contents (i.e., the propositional contents of episodes of 
thinking)4. A prominent way in which the view that the intentional content of thought is 
determined by its phenomenal character is defended, is through the appeal to our 
introspective capacities to individuate thought contents, i.e., to say that phenomenal 
character allows us to know what it is that we are thinking. Pitt (2004) presents the most 
important detailed argument leading to this conclusion. The argument aims to show that 
thoughts have a proprietary, distinctive and individuative phenomenology: phenomenal 
character allows us to consciously and non-inferentially distinguish between thoughts 
																																																						
3 For an overview of the cognitive phenomenology debate, see Bayne and Montague (2011), Breyer and 
Gutland (2016) and Jorba and Moran (2016). 
4 Within phenomenal intentionality views, it would be possible to claim that it is sensory phenomenal 
character that grounds thought-content determinacy; but as far as we know, nobody has defended such a 
prima facie implausible position.  
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and other kinds of episodes, to differentiate each thought content from every other one, 
and to individuate the thought as the thought it is.5 
 Our interest here lies in the individuative claim, which precisely amounts to the 
solution offered by phenomenal intentionality views to the problem of indeterminacy: it 
is the individuative phenomenal character that presumably allows us to individuate the 
thought as the thought it is: to pick out this particular thought and not another one. If the 
thought content did not have the phenomenal character it has—i.e., if it did not appear 
to us in the way it does—it would not have the content it has, not because contents and 
phenomenal characters correlate or are linked in some way, but because phenomenal 
characters metaphysically individuate contents. According to Pitt (2009), the 
individuative thesis that the argument from self-knowledge proposes should be 
understood as the claim that an episode of thinking has a certain content, p, as its 
content, because it tokens a phenomenal type that is the intentional content that p.  
Another view in cognitive phenomenology that presents a version of the 
individuative claim is Strawson’s (2008), where cognitive content is partially 
determined by phenomenal character, and jointly also by both an external causal 
element and a conceptual role aspect. In Strawson’s case, the partial individuation claim 
is proposed as the only viable way to solve the problem of indeterminacy (Strawson, 
2008: 295ff). Besides these specific approaches to the individuative claim as it applies 
to thought contents, defenders of phenomenal intentionality more broadly embrace 
similar claims regarding content in general, which in turn implies determination of 
																																																						
5 The exact formulation of the argument is as follows (Pitt, 2004: 7-8): “Normally (…) one is able, 
consciously, introspectively and non-inferentially (henceforth, ‘Immediately’) to do three distinct (but 
closely related) things: (a) to distinguish one’s occurrent conscious thoughts from one’s other occurrent 
conscious mental states; (b) to distinguish each of one’s occurrent conscious thoughts each from the 
others; and (c) to identify each of one’s occurrent thoughts as the thought it is (i.e., as having the content 
it does). But (the argument continues), one would not be able to do these three things unless each (type 
of) occurrent conscious thought had a phenomenology that is (1) different from that of any other type of 
conscious mental state (proprietary), (2) different from that of any other type of conscious thought 
(distinct), and (3) constitutive of its (representational) content (individuative)”. (For a version of this 
argument applied to cognitive attitudes, see Jorba (2016)).  
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thought content.6 
We would like to note that it certainly appears quite mysterious why such a 
powerful role should be attributed to phenomenal character alone, at least in the case of 
propositional thinking, where part of the explanation depends on purely structural 
features. Indeed, defenders of phenomenal intentionality do not normally explain how it 
is that (cognitive) phenomenal character can deliver determinacy of thoughts: “how can 
[cognitive] experience ever deliver determinateness? It just can. Cognitive experience in 
causal context can do just this” (Strawson, 2010: 351). It seems to us that the absence of 
an explanation at this point, which is often taken as a primitive starting claim for further 
theorizing, is a weakness of the sort of phenomenal intentionality views explored here. 
In fact, it is even possible to grant that thought contents have a certain proprietary and 
distinctive phenomenology, without committing to the individuative thesis. We take it 
that phenomenal character will be content-individuative only if there is no plausible 
alternative way to individuate contents. Otherwise, this individuation thesis only 
establishes that phenomenal characters and contents correlate, such that it is possible 
that while we identify thoughts by means of their phenomenal characters, this only 
amounts to epistemic—not metaphysical—individuation (i.e., identification)7. Pitt’s 
epistemic argument, thus, establishes the individuative claim only in the absence of a 
plausible alternative hypothesis concerning how contents are metaphysically 
individuated. A (reductive) naturalistic theory of thought content would claim that 
contents are individuated by causal or historical relations that hold between the 
organism and the environment; but, as explained, defenders of cognitive 
phenomenology are usually suspicious of extant naturalistic accounts. Our proposal is 
																																																						
6 Accounts of the general determinacy claim have been defended by Loar (1995), Horgan and Tienson 
(2002), Graham et al. (2007), Horgan and Graham (2012), Kriegel (2014) and Farkas (2008), among 
others (see Kriegel, 2014, for an overview). There has also been resistance to the claim that thought 
content is phenomenally individuated (see, e.g., Wilson, 2003; Pautz, 2013).  
7 The account that we find more plausible is that phenomenal characters supervene on contents.  
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that there is an alternative explanation of what determines the content of an episode of 
conscious thinking, such that the alleged distinctive phenomenal character of a thought 
content would individuate it only in the epistemic sense (i.e., it would be just a way of 
identifying it). 
To pave the way, we will start by briefly presenting what seems to be the most 
common reaction to Pitt’s argument from those who reject cognitive phenomenology.   
 
3. Thinking and Inner Speech  
One line of response to Pitt’s argument outlined above is to claim that we are 
never acquainted with thought contents or with episodes of pure thinking. Rather, we 
are only acquainted with imagery, including acoustic/phonological imagery, and with 
imagistic and inner speech episodes. This view still defends that we are able to know 
what we are thinking, though neither by acquaintance nor in any other way that does not 
involve inner speech or other forms of imagery. This kind of account has been endorsed 
by a number of authors with different sensibilities (e.g., Byrne, 2011; Prinz, 2011; 
Jackendoff, 1996; Carruthers, 2011, 2014; Bermúdez, 2003). The idea that these authors 
defend is that we can be, and are actually, only acquainted with the sensory/perceptual 
vehicles of our thoughts, because sensory/perceptual phenomena exhaust our 
phenomenal world: our brains are such that we can only experience the tokening of 
representations at the sensory/perceptual level (Prinz, 2011; Carruthers, 2014).8 
However, knowledge of our thought contents is acquired by forming beliefs on the basis 
of that sensory evidence. Beliefs can yield knowledge because the belief-forming 
mechanism in question is a reliable one. This belief-forming mechanism is the same one 
that we use to form beliefs about what other people think when they speak. For 
																																																						
8 For a discussion of these views in relation to their prospects of explaining our access to thoughts 
contents, see Jorba and Vicente (2014).  
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Carruthers, for example, the mechanism that forms the belief that the other person 
thinks that p, takes the words uttered by the other person as input, and processes it via 
the linguistic and the pragmatic, mind-reading, systems (either in tandem or serially). 
The output of the process is the belief that the other person thinks a certain thought 
content, specifically, the thought content expressed by their words (Carruthers, 2011, 
2014). This process is entirely subpersonal and modular, so there is no step at which the 
subject is or needs to be aware of the thought content expressed by the other person’s 
utterance. When this system is activated not by overt outer speech but by our own inner 
speech, neither do we know, nor are we able to know, what we think by being 
acquainted with our thoughts through experience; we know what we think by 
interpreting the acoustic representations we self—generate and experience.  
This is, roughly, the view that deniers of cognitive phenomenology have ready 
to hand to account for self-knowledge, and which we will call ‘sensory inner speech 
views’, because of their reliance on the sensory aspects of inner speech. One implication 
of this approach is that there is no non-interpretative or non-inferential way of knowing 
our thought contents, which directly opposes Pitt’s (2004) immediacy claim.9 
According to sensory inner speech views, knowledge of our own thoughts must always 
be mediated by our interpretation of sensory elements. Interpreted sensory elements, 
when expressing a certain propositional attitude, constitute an episode of conscious 
thinking10. We thus know the content by interpretation and the vehicle by acquaintance. 
																																																						
9 Pitt rejects the idea that immediate knowledge of thought contents is possible on the basis of the sensory 
phenomenology involved in thinking those thoughts, given that someone could have the relevant image 
without thinking the corresponding thought: “even if thoughts are, as a matter of fact, usually or even 
always accompanied by some kind of auditory or visual imagery (so that such imagery is part of the total 
phenomenology of a conscious thought)—or even if such imagery is necessary for thinking a thought—it 
is not identical to the thought, and it is not in virtue of introspecting such experiences that one 
introspectively knows what one is thinking” (Pitt, 2004: 24). 
10 Perhaps not all episodes of inner speech express propositional attitudes. For instance, one important 
function of inner speech is self-motivation. If you tell yourself, in the middle of a climb ‘go on!’, would 
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Importantly for our purposes here, the sensory inner speech view also has 
implications for the individuative claim. As we have seen, according to Pitt and other 
defenders of cognitive phenomenology, the phenomenal character of a thought 
determines its content, and a reason to maintain this is that no other account is in a 
position to explain the determinacy of the content of our thoughts that is consistent with 
self—knowledge. However, if the content of a thought is related to linguistic 
expression, as in sensory inner speech views, the determinacy problem does not arise; or 
at least, it does not arise as forcefully as it does in a reductive naturalistic theory of 
content determination. To the extent that utterances have determinate contents, provided 
by the contents of their constituent parts and the way those parts are arranged, it can be 
said that the content of a conscious thought is not given by its phenomenal character, 
but by the semantics of a language11. The semantic representations of a language 
represent categories in the world, and syntax provides a means to generate predicative 
constructions, i.e., expressions that can be true or false. The interpretation of a 
phonological string, thus, can provide meaning representations expressing non-
ambiguous, determinate, predicative relations that can be true or false. There are some 
questions that an account such as this has to answer, the most pressing being how 
language could play a role in content determination, given that language is supposed to 
merely reflect the intentionality of thought. Given that a particular version of this 
general approach will constitute the ultimate response we will also provide to the 
individuative claim, we will postpone the discussion of this question till later. First, we 
will explain why the sensory inner speech approach faces an important problem.  
 
																																																																																																																																																														
we say that you are expressing a propositional attitude, and so that you are thinking something; or would 
it just be a non-propositional way of motivating yourself? 
11 Note that we are talking about the semantics of an utterance, not the semantics of a sentence, which is 
plausibly underdetermined (Vicente and Martínez-Manrique, 2008). 
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4. Unsymbolized Thinking  
A relevant problem for the defenders of the sensory inner speech view is the 
existence of unsymbolized thinking (UT). We can distinguish between two different 
types of thinking episodes: those that involve the presence of strings of words or inner 
speech (or some other sort of imagery), and those that do not. Normally, when thinking 
silently, many people report ‘talking to themselves’, so that inner speech is recognized 
as one pervasive phenomenon in our inner lives (Heavey and Hurlburt, 2008; Klinger 
and Cox, 1987—88 ). Thinking with the presence of inner speech is not, however, the 
only way we think propositional contents. Some studies defend the existence of UT 
(Hurlburt and Akhert, 2008; Hurlburt, 2011): experiences of thinking particular 
thoughts that do not include the experience of any other “symbols”, such as phonemes 
or imagery12. This kind of experience is described as one of the five most common 
features of inner experience—the other four being inner speech, inner seeing, feelings 
and sensory awareness (Hurlburt and Akhert, 2008). These studies make use of the 
descriptive experience sampling method (DES). DES is a method that attempts to 
capture what Hurlburt calls “pristine inner experience”: inner experience as it directly 
presents itself in a natural environment. The method consists of two phases. In the first 
phase, subjects carry around with them in their everyday life a beeper that beeps at 
random intervals, and they note down whatever they are experiencing when it beeps. In 
the second phase, they tell the researcher what they have noted down, and the researcher 
asks them questions about the particular experiences that they could discriminate at the 
																																																						
12 Introducing the phenomenon as not involving any ‘symbols’ is misleading, as it might suggest that the 
thinking in question is carried out without any symbols or representations of a natural language, 
something that, we will suggest, may be false. However, we have followed the use of the term as it 
appears in the relevant literature. An example of an instance of UT, which will be discussed below, is the 
following: “Dorothy is tiredly walking down the hall dragging her feet noisily on the carpet. She is 
thinking, if put into words, something quite like, ‘Pick up your feet—it sounds like an old lady’… Despite 
the lack of words, the sense of the thought is very explicit: ‘pick up your feet’ is a more accurate rendition 
of the experienced thought than would be ‘I should pick up my feet’; and ‘it sounds like an old lady’ is 
more accurate than ‘I sound like an old lady’” (Hurlburt and Akhert, 2008: 1364).  
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moment of the beep. These questions help subjects arrive at a more accurate description 
of their experiences, potentially removing presuppositions and previous preconceptions. 
DES in general as well as some of the results (in particular, the existence of UT) 
that Hurlburt and colleagues report, are far from unquestioned (see Hurlburt and 
Schwitzgebel, 2007, for an interesting exchange). However, as Hurlburt et al. (2017) 
comment, there is some evidence that they can adduce in favor of what they consider to 
be their “observational” methodology. Starting with Kühn et al. (2014), Hurlburt and 
colleagues have combined DES with fMRI scans, and have observed, for instance, that 
a previous distinction they had drawn on the basis of subjects’ reports between inner 
speaking and inner hearing, corresponds to the activation of different areas in the brain 
(related, respectively, to language production and comprehension). To date, it seems 
that the fMRI results are compatible with the claims and distinctions made on the basis 
of DES. Notwithstanding, DES seems to be more reliable, careful and theoretically 
grounded than other methods that researchers have used when trying to access inner 
experiences, such as questionnaires or pure introspection.      
There is still no direct evidence from fMRI studies of the existence of UT, 
although the evidence that there is in favor of DES should count as indirect evidence for 
the reality of UT. Meanwhile, sceptics regarding UT who have not questioned DES in 
general have been unable to produce alternative explanations of the phenomenon (see 
Hurlburt, 2011, for defense of the reality of UT). The problems that have been raised 
concerning UT results include: the suggestion that reports of UT may stem from 
confabulation (Engelbert and Carruthers, 2011); that there may be a masking effect 
resulting from the beep used in the experiments (Tye and Wright, 2011); and that UT is 
not, after all, totally devoid of sensory/perceptual representations (Byrne, 2011). None 
of these reactions seems to work. There is no reason why subjects should report that 
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they are experiencing UT instead of experiencing inner speech or imagery or whatever, 
so it is not clear why they should be confabulating. In fact, when they experience UT, 
they are typically genuinely surprised13. Next, if UT only occurred because the beep 
masked the imagery that is being produced right at the moment of the beep, we should 
expect all subjects to report UT, as the beeper would have a masking effect on all 
subjects, at least sometimes. However, there are people who do not report UT at all 
(there are also people who report very infrequent, if any, inner speech: see Hurlburt, 
2011; Hurlburt et al., 2013). Given this, how can the masking hypothesis explain the 
fact that some people do not experience UT? Finally, it is true that Hurlburt (2009: 149-
150) concedes that “the apprehension of an unsymbolized thought may involve the 
apprehension of some sensory bits, as long as those sensory bits are not organized into a 
coherent, central, thematized sensory awareness”.14 However, this is the only time he 
mentions the existence of ‘sensory bits’. Typically, Hurlburt talks about UT simply as 
“the experience of an explicit, differentiated thought that does not include the 
experience of words, images, or any other symbols” (Hurlburt and Akhter, 2008: 1365). 
More importantly, the sensory bits in question do not make up an eventual vehicle of 
the thinking. That is to say, even if UT involved some sensory bits, it would still be a 
different phenomenon from inner speech, inner seeing, feelings and sensory awareness. 
Meanwhile, it has to be noted that the experience associated with UT is not just 
the experience of an episode of thinking in the absence of the experience of inner 
speech or some other sensory vehicle; it is also the experience of thinking a particular 
thought, i.e., a particular content. Both aspects of the overall experience are 
																																																						
13 Hurlburt and Akhter (2008: 1336) make the following observation about the report made by one 
subject: “note that Evelyn appears helpless, powerless in the face of her own observation of her 
experience. Her expression conveys something like the following: I know this sounds weird, and I don’t 
think it’s really possible, but you asked me to tell you exactly what is in my experience and this is it. 
Sorry it doesn’t conform to your expectations, but this is what I was thinking”. 
14 The presence of these sensory bits has been used by Byrne (2011: 122), for instance, to argue that UT 
does not present a problem for views that rely on the presence of inner speech to account for knowledge 
of thought contents. For a response to Byrne, see Samoilova (2015). 
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problematic for defenders of the sensory inner speech view, especially if they aim to 
explain the determinacy of thought content in terms of strings of phonemes.  
Now, concerning the second, content-related aspect of the phenomenology of 
UT, Hurlburt and colleagues can easily find allies in defenders of cognitive 
phenomenology who, by means of phenomenal contrast arguments, argue that we do 
experience the contents of our occurrent cognitive episodes. One such argument 
consists of inviting the reader to compare two readings, each with a different meaning, 
of an ambiguous sentence such as ‘the girl saw the Martian with a telescope’. It seems 
that there is a phenomenal contrast when you move from one reading (the girl has the 
telescope) to the other (the Martian has the telescope). Some defenders of cognitive 
phenomenology would not stop here. Either by means of phenomenal contrast 
arguments that do not involve the production of any kind of sensory experience 
(Kriegel, 2015) or by means of detailed descriptions of what they introspect (Siewert, 
1998)15, they typically argue for the reality of the overall experience that Hurlburt and 
colleagues identify with UT: experiencing non—sensorial thinking, and experiencing its 
content. That is, the existence of UT may be surprising at first, but philosophical 
reflection may provide grounds that support its existence. 	
We take it that, overall, it is plausible to believe in the reality of UT. The point 
now is that for UT, the sensory inner speech account is clearly not available. Indeed, UT 
																																																						
15 On the one hand, Kriegel (2015: 56) presents the case of Zoe, a sensory—algedonic—emotional 
zombie that happens to be a mathematical genius and, after struggling with a mathematical problem, she 
“sees” the solution. On the other hand, Siewert presents the case of thoughts that are a type of ‘non—
iconic thought’, where neither images nor verbalizations are involved: “Walking from my table in a 
restaurant to pay the bill, I was struck briefly by a thought, gone by the time I reached the cashier, about 
my preoccupations with this book’s topic, the effects of this, and its similarity to other preoccupations and 
their effects. Asked to state more precisely what this was, I would have to say something like: ‘My 
preoccupation with the topic of my book has made the world seem especially alive with examples of it, 
references to it, so that it can’t help but seem to me that the world is more populated with things relevant 
to it than previously. And it struck me that this is similar to the way in which new parenthood made the 
world seem to me burgeoning with babies, parents, the paraphernalia of infancy, and talk and pictures of 
these’. Somehow this thought of my philosophical preoccupations and parenthood, and an analogy 
between their effects, rather complex to articulate, occurred in a couple of moments while I approached 
the cashier, in the absence of any utterance” (Siewert, 1998: 277). 
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requires an approach that acknowledges non—sensory mediation of our knowledge of 
contents: something that sensory inner speech views simply deny could exist. Regarding 
episodes of UT, and our knowledge of their contents, Pitt’s approach looks much better 
placed as an explanation. However, we do not think it is necessary to invoke the 
metaphysical individuative claim in order to explain how the contents of UT are 
determined. To see why, we will present our own view of how UT is generated. This 
view accounts for how the contents of UT are determined in the same way it accounts 
for how the contents of our inner speech utterances are determined, although the view is 
itself different from sensory inner speech approaches.   
 
5. Unsymbolized Thinking as Aborted Inner Speech 
The account we want to introduce construes UT as a phenomenon that is closely 
related to inner speech. Let us begin by explaining how, according to current theories, 
the inner voice is produced, which is not very different from how external speech is 
produced. The explanation is that first we form a certain high—level, subconscious 
intention to express something, a content that can be more or less structured (see 
below). We then go through a series of steps, which can include a certain, maybe high, 
degree of back and forth (Hickok and Poeppel, 2007), where we flesh out that high-
level, programmatic intention, giving it form in terms of semantic and syntactic 
structures, phonological representations, and finally articulatory instructions, or motor 
commands, to produce sounds. This is the part where inner speech does not differ from 
outer speech. However, unlike in overt outer speech, right after the motor command is 
issued, it is inhibited. There is time, however, for the monitoring system to receive a 
copy of the motor command and to predict what will happen when the motor command 
is realized (what signals the body is going to receive). According to many proponents of 
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this theory (e.g., Jeannerod, 2006; Carruthers, 2011; Guillot et al., 2012; Perrone-
Bertolotti et al., 2014), when something like this happens, i.e., when in general a motor 
command is inhibited, the result is imagery: if the motor command concerns producing 
speech sounds, the result is the phenomenology of inner speech, i.e., our inner voice. 
Plausibly, the phenomenology of inner speech is generated by making conscious the 
prediction that does not match any actual output (Carruthers, 2011; Pickering and 
Garrod, 2013; Swiney and Sousa, 2014). In general, simulating is making a prediction 
conscious (Jeannerod, 2006). 
This theory draws on the corollary discharge model of perception proposed by 
Helmholtz (1860), and extended by von Holst and Mittelstaedt (1950) and Sperry 
(1950) to deal with motor acts. The model, in general terms, works in the following 
way: whenever a motor command is issued, the brain predicts, based on an efference 
copy (or corollary discharge) and the work of some ‘forward models’, what 
proprioceptive and sensory feedback will ensue. This prediction is used, together with a 
prediction of how the motor command will be executed, to monitor the execution of the 
motor instructions. Both predictions are used to detect errors in execution. The 
prediction of incoming signals is used to detect errors, through comparison with the 
actual sensory signals received. If the prediction matches the signal, the action is self-
ascribed—maybe generating the ‘sense of agency’ (Feinberg, 1978; Frith, 1992, 2012). 
When the monitoring system does not work properly, subjects may end up experiencing 
their actions as alien, as in passivity phenomena such as control delusion, auditory 
verbal hallucinations, and thought insertion (Feinberg, 1978; Frith, 1992).   
 Now, this is a theory of how the inner voice is produced, and it focuses only on 
motor commands and predictions related to sensory signals. However, predictions, 
given their monitoring role (Hickok, 2012), are plausibly issued at different levels 
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(Pacherie, 2008). In the case of speech, some influential psycholinguists argue that the 
production system issues predictions at many levels: at least concerning semantics, 
syntax and phonology (Pickering and Garrod, 2013; Garrod et al., 2013; Gambi and 
Pickering, 2016); or at the ‘formulator’ (semantics and syntax) and the articulator 
(motoric) levels (Hartsuiker, 2014). Pickering and colleagues argue that typically, overt 
speech comparisons for error detection do not use the auditory input of the subject’s 
own voice, but work on the basis of the predictions issued at the different levels. Error 
detection and repair is too quick to rely on comprehension of the external input (i.e., 
overt speech). On their account, semantic errors, such as selecting a meaning or 
semantic representation that does not correspond to the intended meaning, are detected 
and corrected very quickly (in about 300 ms). This suggests that the error is spotted and 
the correction made on the basis of the predicted meaning16. Noteboom and Quené 
(2017) further support this general model by distinguishing two ways of detecting 
errors: internally (i.e., via predictions) and externally (via auditory input or 
proprioceptive/articulatory information). To detect an error in the second way takes 
about 500 ms longer than to do so internally, and repair is even more costly in terms of 
the time required: 700 ms longer than error repair using the internal, predictive system. 
We want to highlight at this point that if a prediction of the sound of a speech 
act is the inner voice, a prediction of the full semantics of a speech act will be the 
																																																						
16 Semantic errors consist of substituting the intended meaning for some other meaning that is close to it 
in the semantic network or similarity space. A famous error (cited by Dell, 1995) is former US president 
Gerald Ford saying to Anwar el-Saddat, then president of Egypt, “the great people of Israel –Egypt, 
excuse, me”. In general, speech errors can be induced in the lab by making people repeat lists of words or 
sentences, or by priming subjects with words or meanings that can interfere with production. Semantic 
errors are induced by making people entertain notions that have strong connections with the words that 
they have to produce. Given that the selection of a meaning has always been thought to be the first step in 
speech production, semantic errors (the “Egypt–excuse me” part of Ford’s utterance) should be the first 
ones to be spotted if people do not rely on actual production for repair. Noteboom and Quené (2017) 
show that there is indeed a way in which we detect and begin to repair all sorts of errors before they are 
spoken or our muscles start moving. First, they show that there are two ways to spot and repair an error, 
one which is much faster than the other. Secondly, they show that most errors are spotted even if subjects 
are in an environment so noisy that they are unable to hear their own voice. 
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meaning/content of such a speech act. That is, a prediction of the full semantics of a 
speech act is nothing other than what we identify as a propositional content. It is 
plausible to believe that our typical inner speech is not just a string of auditory 
representations or an inner voice; rather, it has sound-like properties and meaning. How 
could this be? Carruthers’ view is that we bind the content of what we have said in our 
inner voice after interpreting our inner utterance via the comprehension system 
(Carruthers, 2011, forth.). Another possibility, however, is that our inner speech already 
‘comes’ with a meaning. As we have said, when we form the intention to express a 
certain content and we refine that intention to the point of executing the motor 
commands that ultimately realize it, we issue predictions not just of how the utterance is 
going to sound, but also of what it is going to mean. Now, if instead of executing the 
motor command, we inhibit it, it may be that what enters our consciousness is not just 
an acoustic image, but an acoustic image with a meaning17, given that we have issued 
both kinds of predictions. There is no reason why only the prediction related to the 
motor command should be conscious (that is, unless one is independently committed to 
the view that only sensory states are conscious). The way we experience inner speech, 
in contrast, is very often as if we were thinking in words, that is, as if our inner voice 
were the vehicle of our thoughts. This part of the phenomenology of inner speech can 
be explained if the inner voice comes with its meaning attached; in our terms, if the 
prediction of the acoustics is accompanied by a prediction of the meaning18.  
  Now, what would happen if an instruction to speak never reached the motoric 
component? Suppose that instead of inhibiting our intention to express some thought 
content at the level of speech commands, we inhibited it at a previous level, say, at the 
																																																						
17 Arguably, some cases of inner speech are meaningless, as if you were to repeat to yourself a list of 
numbers to keep them in your memory. But in such cases, we never form the intention to express a 
thought. 
18 For a view similar to this one, albeit different in the details, see Gauker (forth.). 
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level where we have given form to our intention in terms of semantics and syntax, but 
not yet in terms of phonology. In such a case, we would still have issued a prediction 
concerning the meaning of the utterance we were intending to make. What would 
happen next? According to the model, the prediction would be made conscious, 
presenting to you the content of the utterance you did not make, which would come in a 
linguistic format, i.e., with the structure and semantics of a sentence of the language you 
use to talk to yourself19. This would be an episode of UT: an episode involving a 
thought with a propositional content but with no sensory accompaniment. Thus, in our 
construal, episodes of UT have as contents precisely the contents that a subject intends 
to express once they have been structured according to that subject’s language 
(Martínez-Manrique and Vicente, 2015, Vicente and Martínez-Manrique, 2016) 20 21.         
 
6. The Linguistic Nature of Unsymbolized Thinking  
Our account of UT maintains that the content of UT are not ‘thoughts’ properly 
speaking, but meanings of utterances we have aborted22. That is, we do not experience a 
UT just by thinking, but by forming the intention to express a content and then aborting 
it. We think that this view of UT accords with and can be seen as a continuation of inner 
speech, and is appealing once the inner voice is seen as being derived from aborted 
																																																						
19 Not all authors believe that the inner voice is a prediction of the sounds we would hear (see 
Oppenheim, 2013). However, the take-home message is that if the generation of the inner voice is related 
to aborting an intention at some level (say, at the level of motor commands), it makes sense to think that 
the generation of a conscious, unsymbolized episode of thinking is related to aborting an intention at a 
previous level. 
20 ‘Language’ and ‘linguistic’ are used to refer to all the representations and mechanisms involved in the 
typical production of utterances in a particular natural language (even if an utterance is not produced 
because production is inhibited). Note that this account implies that only linguistic animals will 
experience episodes of UTs. 
21 For a similar view, see H. Lœvenbruck et al. (forth.) 
22 One could object that the idea that instances of UT are not thoughts properly speaking is a problem at 
the level of phenomenology because it might suggest that subjects misconstrue their experience of UT 
when they report it as thinking and not as a form of inner speech, for example. The fact is that there 
certainly is a proprietary experience of UT, but is it one of thinking? It seems that we cannot know: the 
only thing we do know is that we talk about it as thinking, and the same happens many times with inner 
speech. This seems to be the most we can say at the level of phenomenology.  
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commands. However, we will try to make our view plausible in itself by focusing on the 
nature of UT23.  
 Firstly, the view makes UT continuous not only with inner speech (and, e.g., 
muttering to oneself), but with other phenomena that Hurlburt and his collaborators 
have uncovered, such as partially unworded and totally unworded inner speech (see also 
Martínez-Manrique and Vicente, 2015; Vicente and Martínez-Manrique, 2016). 
According to Hurlburt et al., (partially or totally) unworded speech refers to episodes in 
which subjects regard their inner experience as a variety of inner speech in which there 
are parts missing. This is better understood in the cases of partially unworded speech, 
such as “you experience yourself as speaking, ‘That is a very strong ______ – maybe it 
is a gas leak!’ with a temporal space reserved for the word ‘odor’ but the word ‘odor’ 
itself is not actually in your experience” (Hurlburt and Heavey, 2006: 211). There is, 
however, a more puzzling category distinguished by Hurlburt and collaborators in their 
analysis: the case of totally unworded speech—or unworded speech, simpliciter. This is 
“the experience of speaking in your own inner voice except that you have no experience 
of words at all” (2006: 211). They characterize experiences of unworded speech as 
instances in which “you have the sense of speaking, and are directly aware of the vocal 
characteristics of that speaking (rate, inflection, timbre, rhythm, etc.), and are directly 
																																																						
23 An apparently simple way to explain UT, which is in broad agreement with naturalistic approaches to 
content determination, is as follows. Our thought contents (of our propositional attitudes) are the contents 
of Mentalese sentences that we token in our minds/brains. Usually, these thought contents are not 
conscious; however, if we attend to the episodes they form part of, or, alternatively, if we embed them in 
another Mentalese sentence, we can experience them. A problem with this sort of proposal is that there is 
no extant explanation of how we can convert the tokening of an LoT sentence into an experience of 
thinking a thought, that is, an experience related to the content (and no other properties) of the thought, 
and to us doing something—the experience of agency. Levine (2011), in fact, uses the Mentalese 
hypothesis to explain how we could have knowledge of our own thoughts without experiencing anything 
at all. This problem by itself does not rule out the Mentalese explanation, since it may be that future 
developments of the LoT hypothesis tackle the issue of how the tokening of a Mentalese sentence can 
give rise to the experience of thinking a thought. So we cannot discard the idea that contents of UT are 
tokenings of Mentalese sentences; although we also want to note that no Mentalese story has yet 
explained what determines the denotations (contents) of mental representations—which is the issue that 
defenders of the individuative claim hold is still problematic. 
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aware of the meaning of what is being ‘said,’ even though no words are present” (2006: 
211-12). What we seem to have here is a gradation, at the level of sensory experience, 
that goes from expanded (i.e., non—fragmentary) inner speech to UT, plus the 
preservation of: (i) the experience associated with meaning in all cases; and (ii) many of 
the situations typically associated with inner speaking (Hurlburt et al., 2013)24.  
As we have said, when we have an experience as of an inner voice, we usually 
also have an experience associated with its meaning. Very often, we claim that we think 
in inner speech. Our experience, thus, is not restricted to the acoustic part of inner 
speech, but includes content—as opposed to those cases where we use the inner voice 
just to hold some information in memory. This holds for all the different formats that 
inner speech may take according to Hurlburt’s classification: expanded, fragmentary, 
partially unworded and totally unworded inner speech. UT would be an extreme case, 
where only the content of inner speech is experienced. The difference between UT and 
unworded speech would be that the former lacks the experience of sequentiality or 
‘unfolding’. However, there seems to be no clear situation of use of UT that 
distinguishes it from inner speech. Both UT and inner speech can be involved in ‘hard’ 
tasks (like looking for your keys) as well as in ‘lighter’ ones (such as commenting on 
what you are seeing). We will probably not find UT in preparing a lecture, or rehearsing 
a dialogue, but this should not be surprising.    
Secondly, Hurlburt and Akhter (2008) tell us that instances of UT have an 
explicit and differentiated content, such that the ‘about what’ and the ‘what about it’ are 
plainly apprehended and are not general or vague. Moreover, reports can make fine-
grained discriminations between contents, as exemplified by this quote: 
																																																						
24 This apparent continuity is also highlighted by Hurlburt and colleagues: “As a result, the DES method 
[…] would conclude that Susan’s apprehensions of her pristine experiences include a range of 
completeness in the inner expression of words, ranging from quite completely expressed with explicitly 
apprehended prosody… to innerly speaking with implied words … to thinking without words at all …” 
(Hurlburt et al., 2017: 8). On this continuity point, see also Lœvenbruck et al. (forth.). 
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“Dorothy is tiredly walking down the hall dragging her feet noisily on the carpet. 
She is thinking, if put into words, something quite like, ‘Pick up your feet—it 
sounds like an old lady’… Despite the lack of words, the sense of the thought is 
very explicit: ‘pick up your feet’ is a more accurate rendition of the experienced 
thought than would be ‘I should pick up my feet’; and ‘it sounds like an old 
lady’ is more accurate than ‘I sound like an old lady’” (2008: 1364). 
 Explicitness and the ability to choose, and stick to, some phrasing instead of 
some other, show that UT has an easy interaction with the verbal system. Contents of 
UT have predicative structure, and they come ‘formatted’ in a structure we can easily 
recognize. It may be that they even come with a certain order, i.e., head–final or head–
initial. This point has not been explored in the literature, but we think it is a plausible 
hypothesis in order to explain reportability. This would convert contents of UT into 
linguistic items already linearized and ready for emission. 
Thirdly, UT is typically experienced as thinking, that is, as something we are 
doing. Where does this sense of agency come from? Our view allows for an explanation 
as to why we feel that we are the agents of our UT. As we have mentioned, according to 
an influential account, we experience the sense of agency when the signals coming from 
the world and our body match our predictions. We think that we can explain the sense 
of agency experienced when thinking if we move in that direction. Even though the 
application of the model to the cognitive domain may not be straightforward (see, e.g., 
Frith, 2012; Vicente, 2014), it is plausible that models such as those proposed by Rapin 
el at. (2013), Swiney and Sousa (2014) and Lœvenbruck et al. (forth.), which explain 
agency in inner speech in terms of comparisons between goal states and predicted states, 
could also explain agency in UT. The proposal is that we experience agency when 
thinking because we compare a certain output (UT content) to a desired state. 
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 It is true, in contrast, that we do not always experience agency in thinking: 
sometimes we experience what are called ‘unbidden thoughts’. However, it may be that 
unbidden thoughts are a different kind of phenomenon. On the basis of their use of 
DES, Hurlburt and Heavey (2013) have distinguished between inner speaking and inner 
hearing: sometimes we feel we are the ones speaking to ourselves, but some other times 
we feel we are just listening to our own inner voice. In an interesting, already mentioned 
study using fMRI, Hurlburt and colleagues (Kühn et al., 2014) have seen that the brain 
areas involved in inner speaking are actually different from the brain areas involved in 
inner hearing. In general terms, inner speaking is associated with production areas, 
while inner hearing is associated with comprehension areas. Thus, it may turn out that 
inner speaking and inner hearing are two different kinds of phenomena. This suggests 
that thinking and having unbidden, or passive, thoughts, may be two different 
phenomena as well. In such a case, we might have an explanation for one kind of 
phenomenon, i.e., for active thinking, and we can hope that we could capitalize on an 
explanation that accounts for inner hearing (yet to come) in order to explain unbidden 
thoughts. At any rate, discovering that there is a parallel between UT and inner speech 
also at the level of agency strengthens the view that there has to be continuity between 
them.  
 
7. Aborted Inner Speech and Thought-Content Individuation 
We have so far suggested that our proposal of aborted inner speech is able to 
explain UT in a way that is continuous with inner speech and presents some explanatory 
virtues. But how is it related to cognitive phenomenology and its individuative claim?  
Suppose that, in effect, each UT content has a distinctive phenomenal character. 
Would this mean that the content of UT is given, and so determined, by such 
23	
	
phenomenal character? We think that our model has important consequences for the 
question of the determinacy of content, and that it might also have some for the relation 
between conscious and unconscious intentionality.  
Above, we said that Pitt’s argument only establishes the individuative claim if 
phenomenal character is the only candidate available for content individuation. Even if 
each content has a distinctive phenomenal character, and even if we epistemically 
identify the contents of our thoughts via their phenomenal character, it does not follow 
that such phenomenal character is content individuative in the metaphysical sense. It is 
possible that phenomenal character supervenes on the real content-determining factors. 
If such a supervenience claim is correct, then we have reason to think that phenomenal 
character is a reliable means by which to know the content of a thought25. Even if 
phenomenal character plays this epistemic role, the view we have proposed is that the 
content-determining factors are linguistic: the content of a conscious thought is given by 
the content of its constituent semantic representations and the way these are 
syntactically combined. In this specific respect, our proposal coincides with the account 
that the sensory inner speech views presented above could advance, except that they 
cannot account for the case of UT. 
Note, though, that in section 3, we left an issue open. We argued that defenders 
of the sensory inner speech approach could hold that thought propositional contents are 
provided by language. But then we asked how it could be that language played that role 
if, allegedly, language is a representational tool that derives its intentionality from 
thought, i.e., if language just expresses thought. Now it is time to tackle this question, 
given our appeal to linguistic mechanisms. There are two general ways one could 
proceed that could fit in with the picture we have advanced. The first, more conservative 
																																																						
25 Thanks to an anonymous referee for calling our attention to this point.  
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route, is to grant a Gricean perspective on linguistic production, according to which we 
form intentions to express a determinate propositional content. The second, stronger 
route, is to deny the Gricean view and the presumption that language is a means of 
expressing, inter alia, pre—existing propositional contents. In the first case, we will 
argue that the determinate contents of our conscious episodes of thinking (delivered by 
our linguistic production system) are the result of a process of representational re—
description and so differ from the alleged determinate contents of non-linguistic 
thought. In the second case, we will present some ideas that could support a split 
between unconscious, non—determinate and non—linguistic thinking, on the one hand; 
and conscious, determinate and linguistic, thinking, on the other.  
 The conservative approach maintains that unconscious thoughts, in virtue of 
being something akin to Mentalese representations, for instance, are in general just as 
determinate as conscious thoughts are. That is, the message that we want to convey by 
uttering a certain linguistic representation has a predicative but not a linguistic format26, 
and a determinate truth—conditional content27. This is, basically, the orthodox, good 
old-fashioned picture present not only in philosophy, but also in speech production: it is 
Levelt’s model (Levelt, 1989). However, note that even if this model were adopted, it 
can still be claimed that the content of our conscious thoughts is not given by the 
content of the thought we want to express, but by the semantics and the syntax of our 
language. That is, even if the thought content we want to express is allegedly fully 
determinate, it has to undergo a process of representational re-description in order to 
																																																						
26 By non-linguistic here we mean that the thought to be expressed does not use the apparatus of a natural 
language but is supported by some other vehicle such as Mentalese. It is also a possibility that the 
message to be conveyed is linguistically supported and structured. This is Chomsky’s idea that we use 
language—not LoT—for thinking, and that speaking consists of externalizing an already linguistically 
structured message (Chomsky, 2016). In this case, the content of most or all (proper) thinking, conscious 
and unconscious, is given by linguistic representations.  
27 Critics of the naturalist program would of course complain that proponents of such an account still owe 
an explanation of where this determinate truth-conditional content comes from. We are leaving this worry 
to one side for the moment. 
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take on a linguistic form. It is a matter of contention how much re—description such a 
process involves; but we take it that it is plausible to think that, besides formatting 
according to a grammar, the re—description also involves the recruitment of semantic 
representations that do not map neatly onto our conceptual structures (Malt and Majid, 
2013), such that the truth conditions of the thought content we want to express are not 
identical to the truth conditions of the utterance we produce as the expression of that 
thought content. In particular, if the determinacy of our non—linguistic thoughts is 
given by the contents of something akin to Mentalese representations, which by and 
large are supposed to be universal, we have reason to believe that those contents have to 
be poured into a very different mold for them to be expressed in our language, given 
how little the categories drawn by one language in one domain have in common with 
the categories drawn by a different language in the same domain (even in “simple” 
cases such as colors, space or spatial relationships: see Evans and Levinson, 2009)28. In 
the case of colors, for instance, there is mounting evidence that there are two ways of 
forming categories: one is more or less universal, and the other is diverse and language 
specific. Interestingly, even at this level, the categorization of colors that involves the 
left hemisphere of the brain appears to engage linguistic production (Regier and Kay, 
2009)29. So it seems that it is plausible to believe that whenever linguistic production is 
involved, the categories represented by the system differ from the categories drawn by 
the non-linguistic systems. In any event, our point is that the content we are acquainted 
																																																						
28 For example: it may be that the way of conceptualizing spatial relations is universal and that we all 
distinguish tight versus loose containment relations (at least that would be the case if we conceptualize as 
infants do: see Hespos and Spelke, 2004, for the relevant data and discussion). Thus, if we see a ring on a 
finger, we—determinacy problems aside—would conceptualize the relation as one of tight containment. 
Now, when we want to express the eventual thought content that the finger is in a tight-containment 
relation with the ring, our utterance will say that the ring is on the finger. Note that such an utterance will 
be true even if the finger is in a loose containment relation with the ring. Note also that our claim is that 
episodes of UT have contents such as the ring is on the finger, and not contents such as the finger is in a 
tight-containment relation with the ring. 
29 For more results that point towards a major involvement of on-line uses of language in categorization, 
see, e.g., Lupyan (2012). 
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with is given by representations and structures provided by our linguistic systems. That 
is, what we are conscious of are contents whose determinate truth conditions are given 
by categories drawn by the words of our language and the structures that constitute the 
grammar of that language.  
The second, stronger and more interesting line of response involves denying the 
presumption that language is a means of expressing, inter alia, pre—existing 
propositional contents. It therefore approaches the issue of how the unconscious 
thoughts that we intend to express relate to the conscious thoughts that we have by 
exploring the idea that conscious thought contents have a degree of determinacy that 
unconscious thought contents lack (Crane, 2017). This route would resemble those 
phenomenal intentionality views that are committed to a disanalogy between conscious 
and unconscious thoughts, even if for reasons different from ours (see Kriegel, 2014, for 
a survey of positions). The idea that we want to scrutinize is that thought content needs 
to be brought to consciousness for its content to be fully determined. Otherwise, our 
occurrent mental states are not entirely determinate or specific about their contents: to 
have a conscious thought is not simply to have an unconscious thought that is made 
conscious by way of attending to it or by broadcasting it. There is something more in 
this process: ‘coming to consciousness’ involves attributing determinacy to contents. 
That is, conscious intentionality is not a derivative kind of intentionality. What could 
explain determinacy in our picture?  
The account of UT that we have proposed so far could explain how it is that 
episodes of thinking a content that we are conscious of have a determinate aboutness 
not based on their alleged phenomenal character. Suppose that UT contents are, as we 
have said, the result of broadcasting predictions issued after the construction of 
linguistic messages has reached the level of the ‘formulator’ (Hartsuiker, 2014; 
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Lœvenbruck et al., forth.): the level where the thought to be expressed is formatted 
according to the representations and rules of our language30. At this level, the message 
consists of a predicative structure elaborated on the basis of semantic representations 
and syntactic rules. Such a message has a determinate content and determinate truth 
conditions. Regardless of what the thought that we want to express looks like, 
‘translating’ it into our language involves shaping it in accordance with representations 
of categories in the world which, when composed, represent states of affairs (and thus 
can be true of false). This is indeed what the content of an instance of UT looks like, 
and it is the level of determinacy that our conscious thoughts seem to have. So 
language, intentionality, and consciousness would come together in the following way: 
content determinacy is given to thoughts via linguistic mechanisms, and this 
determinacy appears when a certain step of the language production process, i.e., the 
prediction of the meaning to be issued, is externalized and made conscious (so 
intentionality appears as such, with determined content, at the conscious level) 31.   
																																																						
30 An anonymous referee has asked whether speech production could be aborted even earlier (at a higher 
level of the process). This would indeed be a possibility; but the question is whether there is a level above 
the level of semantics where a monitoring system issues predictions. None of the extant models 
contemplate the hypothesis that there is a level of predictions higher than semantic predictions, since 
there seem to be no errors related to such a level. Now, if the first stage at which we issue predictions in 
speech production is the recruitment of meanings, aborting at a previous stage, if it could be done, would 
not in any case result in the production of a conscious experience.    
31 A question we have not entered into concerns the mechanism of how predictions are made conscious. 
Carruthers (2014, forth.) holds that, just as for any other phenomenon related to consciousness, 
predictions are made conscious by receiving attention. In Carruthers’ view, it is possible that we generate 
several different predictions on the basis of their corresponding aborted motor commands, and that only 
one of them is attended to and thus made conscious. We are skeptical of Carruthers’ approach, not only 
because there seems to be little evidence favoring it, but mainly because it seems to depart from the 
assumption that the forward models system is a monitoring system, i.e., a system dedicated to 
determining whether a certain output corresponds to our intentions. However, if Carruthers were right, 
then for every conscious inner speech episode there could be some other, competing, unconscious inner 
speech episodes that did not receive attention (and the same would hold for semantic predictions). This 
possibility would complicate the picture we want to put forward. Given that we suggest that thought 
contents acquire their determination via the linguistic system, with the forward model system making 
those determinate contents conscious—thus securing a correspondence between determinacy and 
consciousness—a picture such as Carruthers’ would call this strict correspondence into question. Some 
unconscious thoughts would also have determinate contents: those that are produced by the linguistic 
system but do not receive attention. 
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Our unconscious thinking may not be determinate. It is certainly possible that 
there is no such thing as a LoT, so that unconscious inferences do not work in a 
language—like medium but, e.g., on representations in conceptual spaces of a 
prototypical nature (Gauker, 2011) or on map—like representations (Camp, 2009)32. 
Many philosophers working on animal cognition believe that animal thinking is not 
propositional (see also Bermúdez, 2003). Perhaps it also lacks the sort of determinacy 
that our thinking has (Glock, 2000). Now, it is not unreasonable to believe that our 
unconscious thinking is similar to animal thinking. According to such a view, 
recursivity, productivity, compositionality and determinacy would be properties, not of 
thought in general, but of the linguistic system. Actually, we think that this latter view is 
the mainstream one in generative linguistics (Chomsky, 2016; Berwick and Chomsky, 
2016); except that in the view of generative linguists, language enables recursivity in 
thinking without engaging the production system33. In our view, to engage the linguistic 
system and benefit from its properties, we have to speak; and one way of quasi-
speaking, but close enough to speaking for it to be possible to benefit from the 
properties of our language, is to produce UT contents. 
Now, we can see that our account offers a way to relate (even if in a weak sense) 
intentionality and consciousness that is an alternative to claiming that phenomenality 
grounds intentionality. Our account allows us to claim that one aspect of intentionality, 
namely, determined content, appears at the conscious level, so there is a connection 
																																																						
32 There is some debate concerning whether conceptual spaces and maps can produce predicative 
structures. That is a debate we will not enter into as we mention conceptual spaces and maps only for 
illustrative purposes, as putative examples of representational systems that could support an interesting 
cognitive life without necessarily being used to form propositions.  
33 In this regard, Chomsky’s view is similar to Spelke’s (see Spelke, 2003), which simply claims that the 
combinatorial system of language enables intermodular thinking. In Carruthers’ (2002) development of 
Spelke’s insight, it is not language as such, but the production/comprehension system that provides the 
possibility of having intermodular thoughts. The contrast between our view and Chomsky’s is analogous 
to this contrast between Spelke’s and Carruthers’ views. 
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between intentionality and consciousness34. However, the elements responsible for the 
determinacy of thought contents are provided by linguistic representations and 
structures; in particular, the syntax and semantics of the subject’s own language. In this 
sense, it is not (phenomenal) consciousness, but language that explains conscious 
thought-content determinacy. As can be seen, the idea is ultimately in general accord 
with the view that conscious thinking (system 2 thinking) involves language (Frankish, 
2004).    
Above, we said that Pitt’s argument only establishes the individuative claim if 
phenomenal character is the only candidate available for content individuation. Even if 
each content has a distinctive phenomenal character, it does not follow that such a 
phenomenal character is content—individuative in the metaphysical sense. It is possible 
that phenomenal character just supervenes on the real content—determining factors. 
The view we propose herein is that the content—determining factors are linguistic: the 
content of a conscious thought is given by the content of its constituent semantic 
representations and the way they are syntactically combined. In this, the proposal 
coincides with the proposal that the sensory inner speech views presented above could 
also advance, except that their proposal cannot account for the case of UT. Here, we 
cannot give an account of what gives a natural language its semantics (and so in that 
sense we must leave open the question of how UT acquires its content). Yet, we hope to 
have provided support for the idea that the project of understanding the content of UT 
and that of understanding the content of a natural language is one and the same project. 
 
8. Conclusions  
																																																						
34 This connection amounts to a correlation between the occurrence of conscious thought and its having 
determinate content, and in this sense it is a form of weak inseparatism. Relevantly, the view does not 
embrace the stronger grounding claim that normally accompanies inseparatism according to which 
conscious thought content is phenomenally determined.  
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Phenomenal intentionality views defend the idea that intentionality is grounded 
in phenomenal character. Following this idea, some defenders of cognitive 
phenomenology make the case for thought or cognition, stating that cognitive 
phenomenology is content—individuative. We have claimed that this individuative 
thesis, being a metaphysical claim, is established only if phenomenal character is the 
only available candidate for content individuation. One alternative may be given by 
‘sensory inner speech’ views, which ascribe the role of determination to linguistic 
structure and representations, but we have argued that they fail to accommodate the case 
of UT. Our view construes UT as continuous with inner speech, and the linguistic 
mechanism underlying both phenomena is what accounts for thought—content 
individuation, without postulating the metaphysical phenomenal individuative claim. 
We thus propose an approach to conscious thought content determination that is 
alternative to naturalistic, sensory inner speech views and phenomenal intentionality 
accounts; and which has independent plausibility and some interesting consequences for 
the relation of unconscious and conscious thought.   
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